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1.  Introduction 
 
The underlined Nouns Phrases (NPs) in (1) have been called ‘Concealed 
Questions’ (CQ, henceforth) because sentences that embed them typically have 
the same truth-conditional meaning as the corresponding versions with a full-
fledged embedded interrogative clause, as illustrated in (2) (Heim 1979): 
 
(1)  a. John knows the price of milk.  
  b. They announced the winner of the contest. 
  c. The temperature of the lake depends on the season. 
 
(2)  a. John knows how much the milk costs. 
  b. They announced who won the contest. 
 c . How warm the lake is depends on what season it is. 
 
The goal of this talk is to review three main approaches to CQs in the 
literature –the pragmatic account, the individual concept account and the 
propositional account–, and to evaluate them with respect to several empirical 
patterns. The comparison across different data sets will lead to some conclusions 
and some important open questions, helping characterize the state of the art of the 
CQ debate in the literature. 
Three main approaches to CQs will be discussed. The first one is the   
pragmatic approach in Heim (1979), in which [[know]] combines with an object of 
type e. For example, in (1a) [[know]] would combine with the dollar amount (or 
degree on a scale) provided by the NP the price of milk. The second approach is 
the individual concept approach (Lasersohn 2005, Romero 2005a, among others). 
In this case, [[know]] in (1a) would combine with an object of type <s,e> provided 
by the NP the price of milk. Finally, in the propositional approach (Romero 
2005b, Nathan 2005), [[know]] would combine with an object of type <s,t> (or 
type <s,<s,t>>) arising from the NP the price of milk in (1a). 
As we evaluate these approaches, we will examine the following five 
empirical patterns: 
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 (i) Simple concealed questions like the ones in (1).   
(ii) Coordination of different types of verbs sharing the same NP 
complement. 
(iii) Heim’s (1979) ambiguity with nested concealed questions, illustrated 
in (3). Under a first reading –reading A in (4)–, (3) says that John knows the same 
price as Fred knows, e.g., they both know how much the milk costs. Under a 
second reading –reading B in (5)–, (3) asserts that John knows what price Fred 
knows. For example, this second reading would be true if Fred knows how much 
the milk costs and John knows that Fred knows how much the milk costs. Note 
that –assuming e.g. that the unique (relevant) price that Fred knows is the price of 
milk– reading A requires John to know how much the milk costs but reading B 
does not. 
 
(3)  John knows the price that Fred knows. 
 
(4)  Reading A: “John knows the same price that Fred knows.” 
 
(5)  Reading B: “John knows what price Fred knows.” 
   
  (iv) Gupta’s syllogism. The verbs rise, fall and change have been argued 
to combine with individual concepts in sentences like (6) (Montague 1974, 
Dowty, Wall and Peters 1981, Lasersohn 2005). As we will see, Montague’s 
analysis of (6) faces a problem with the syllogism in (7): the analysis predicts the 
argument to be invalid even though it is intuitively valid (Dowty, Wall and Peters 
1981, citing Gupta): 
 
(6)  a.   The temperature of the lake is rising / falling. 
  b.   The price of milk changes every week. 
 
(7) Gupta’s  syllogism: 
  i.   Necessarily, the temperature is the price. 
  ii.  The temperature is rising  /  changed.       
  iii.  The price is rising  / changed. 
 
(v) Difference between NPs with rise / fall / change and NPs with know. 
Although NPs with rise / fall / change and NPs with know have been all analyzed 
as contributing an individual concept, important empirical differences remain 
between the two types. This is illustrated in (8). The NP the picture on Jordan’s 
wall seems to provide the right type of argument for changes but not for know. 
 
(8)  A:  John says he visits his niece Jordan with some frequency, but when I 
asked him what picture she has on her wall, he had no idea. 
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didn’t know the picture on Jordan’s wall.         (Nathan 2005:59) 
 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the pragmatic 
account. Section 3 evaluates the individual concept account. Section 3 takes us to 
the propositional account. Section 5 summarizes the conclusions and points at 
some important open questions. 
 
 
2.  Pragmatic Account 
 
Heim’s (1979) tentatively proposes a pragmatic account for simple CQs. Know 
has two internal arguments: an individual argument of type e, provided by the 
extension of the NP, and a property argument P of type <e,st>, contextually 
provided. Under this account, (9a) is translated as in (9b). For the property 
argument P, there is a strong pragmatic principle that makes P default to the 
property mentioned in the NP. Under the influence of this principle, the property 
P in (9b) would be resolved as in (9c).  
 
(9)   a.   John knows the capital of Italy. 
 b.    λw. know (j, ιxe[capital-of-Italy(x,w)], P, w) 
  c.    “John knows Rome as having the property P”, where P is 
pragmatically resolved to “being the capital of Italy”. 
 
Heim makes the point that this pragmatic bias is not mandatory, that is, that P 
sometimes gets a value different from the property mentioned in the NP. For 
example, (10b) could be resolved as in (10c), as the sentence (10a) is true in 
scenario (11). 
 
(10)  a.  John knows the most ridiculous price of the store (: the price of milk). 
 b.    λw. know (j, ιxe[most-ridiculous-price(x,w)], P, w) 
  c.   “John knows the actual most ridiculous price of the store –e.g., $1.99–
as having the property P”, where P is pragmatically resolved to “being 
the price of milk”. 
 
(11)   Scenario: John knows how much the milk costs at the store, in particular, 
he knows that the milk costs $1.99. John knows no other price. As it turns 
out, the most ridiculously priced object in the store is the milk. John is not 
aware of the ridiculous character of this pricing. 
 
The assumption that the NP denotes an individual of type e and that the 
pragmatic P can in principle be resolved to a contextually salient property faces 
several problems. 
First, as noted in Romero (2005a), if the value of P can sometimes arise 
contextually, then (12) should be able to mean “John knows Rome as being the 
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matter how much one plays with the context, (12) does not have a CQ reading.
1 
 
(12)  # John knows Rome. 
 
The second problem concerns coordination. If all that the CQ NP really 
needs to contribute is an individual xe, then, regardless of how the value for P is 
achieved, we would expect that the NP can be shared in a coordination structure 
involving a regular extensional verb and a CQ verb. This is contrary to fact, as 
shown in (13).
2 
 
(13)  a.   # Sam told me, and Kim actually visited, the capital of Vermont.             
(Nathan 2005) 
  b.   # John guessed and kissed the winner of the oscar for best actress.        
(Romero 2004) 
 
  Third and finally, Heim’s (1979) ambiguity for nested concealed questions 
cannot be derived in this approach (Romero 2005a). To see this, consider example 
(3), repeated as (14), and the truth conditions (15) that this approach assigns to it.  
(14)  John knows the price that Fred knows. 
 
(15)  λw. know (j, ιxe[price(x,w) ∧ know(f,xe,Q,w)], P, w) 
 
Assuming that Fred knows how much the milk costs and that the milk 
costs $1.99, we can derive reading A using the values for P and Q in (16). This 
will give us the paraphrase "John knows as the price of milk the dollar amount xe 
that Fred knows as the price of milk". This is truth conditionally equivalent to 
reading A: “John knows the same price that Fred knows.” 
 
(16) xe  = $1.99 
  Q  =  “being the price of milk” 
ιxe[price(x,w) ∧ know(f,x,Q,w)]   =  $1.99  
P  =  “being the price of milk” 
 
  For reading B, the closest that we can get to it in this approach is (17). The 
resulting paraphrase will be "John knows as having the property P the dollar 
amount xe that Fred knows as the price of milk", where P is the property “being 
the (dollar) value of the price that Fred knows”.  
                                                 
1In languages like Spanish in which epistemic 'know' and acquaintance 'know' are lexically 
distinct, the epistemic version of (12) is simply ungrammatical: 
(i)  * Juan sabe Roma. 
    Juan knowsEpi Rome   
 'John knowsEpi Rome.' 
2See also anaphora data in Romero (2004:§3.1) and Nathan (2005).  
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(17) xe  = $1.99 
  Q  =  “being the price of milk” 
ιxe[price(x,w) ∧ know(f,x,Q,w)]   =  $1.99  
  P  =  “being the dollar value of the price 
that Fred knows” 
 
But, though close, this is not reading B. (17) requires that John knows $1.99 as 
having the property “being the value of the price that Fred knows”. Reading B –
namely,  “John knows what price Fred knows”– does not require that John knows  
$1.99 as the value of the price Fred knows.  
  Given the shortcomings of this pragmatic approach, we abandon it and 
move to other alternatives.
3 
  
 
3.  Individual Concept Account    
 
Heim (1979) entertains and Romero’s (2005a) further develops an individual 
concept (IC) approach to CQs. In this approach, know+CQ is an intensional verb 
taking as its internal semantic argument an intensional object of type <s,e>, or of 
type <s,<s,e>>, etc., resulting in the crosscategorial lexical entry in (18): 
 
(18) [[know+CQ]]   =  λyτλxeλw. ∀w’∈Doxx(w) [ y(w’) = y(w) ] , 
                  where τ = <s,e> or <s,<s,e>> or… 
 
  This applies to a simple example like (9a), repeated as (20a), as follows. 
The complement NP the capital of Italy must provide an intensional object, in this 
case the individual concept in (19), that is, the intension of the NP. This 
intensional object fills the argument yτ of know. The resulting truth conditions for 
the sentence are in (20b). 
 
(19)  Semantic contribution of the CQ the capital of Italy:     
λw”. ιxe [capital-of-Italy(x,w”)] 
 
                                                 
3A different pragmatic account of CQs is developed in Frana (2006, this volume). Although I 
have not seen the finished version of that paper, the key idea is to extend Kratzer’s (2002) 
treatment of know+CP to know+CQ. Instead of combining [[know+CP]] with a proposition, [[know+CP]] 
combines with a fact pragmatically provided and with the proposition contributed by the CP. In 
the same vein, [[know+CQ]] would combine not with an individual concept, but with an object xτ 
pragmatically provided and with a property of objects of type τ contributed by the NP. This 
promising approach may be able to avoid the shortcomings of the pragmatic approach discussed 
in the text and inherit some of the advantages that we will discuss for the individual concept 
approach. Furthermore, it allows for an elegant treatment of indefinite CQs. (For comparison, see 
the treatment of indefinite CQs in the propositional approach in the appendix at the end of the 
present paper.) A closer look at Frana’s approach is left for future research.  
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b.  λw.∀w’∈Doxj(w)  
      [ λw”.ιxe[cap-of-Italy(x,w”)] (w’)  =  λw”.ιxe[cap-of-Italy(x,w”)] (w) ] 
          =   λw. ∀w’∈Doxj(w)  
 [  ιxe[capital-of-Italy(x,w’)] = ιxe[capital-of-Italy(x,w)] ] 
 
  Romero (2005a) notes that, in general, the intensional argument needed 
for a (de dicto attitude reading of) regular intensional verbs like look for can be 
drawn not just from the intension of the complement NP, but also from its 
extension. This is illustrated in (21)-(22). In (21), look for takes as its semantic 
argument the INTENSION of the NP the unicorn with the longest horn. In (22), 
look for takes as its semantic argument the EXTENSION of the NP, which is an 
intensional object itself. This yields the reading (22a), in which John is in a de 
dicto search in relation to the individual concept –e.g., λw”.ιxe[unicorn-with-
longest-horn(x,w”)]–  that the NP the unicorn Fred is looking for refers to in the 
actual world.    
 
(21)  John is looking for the unicorn with the longest horn. 
  a. ‘In all of John’s bouletic alternatives w’ in w: John finds in w’ the 
individual that is the unicorn with the longest horn in w’ (whichever 
that may be).’ 
 
(22)  John is looking for the unicorn Fred is looking for (: the one with the 
longest horn.) 
a.  ‘Each x out of John and Fred is such that, in all of x’s bouletic 
alternatives w’ in w: x finds in w’ the individual that is the unicorn 
with the longest horn in w’ (whichever that may be).’ 
 
  The freedom to choose the intension or the extension of the complement 
NP –as long as the result is a intensional object of the right type– is, according to 
Romero (2005a), the source of the ambiguity between reading A and reading B in 
nested CQ examples. Reading A of (23) arises when matrix know takes as its 
semantic argument the extension of the complement NP.  Reading B arises when 
matrix know takes the intension of the NP instead.  
 
(23)  John knows the price that Fred knows. 
a.   Reading A: [[know+CQ]] + EXTENSION of the price that Fred knows. 
b.   Reading B: [[know+CQ]] + INTENSION of the price that Fred knows. 
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knows is spelled out in (24).
4 The top line in (24) gives us the intension of the 
entire NP.  
 
(24)  the price that Fred knows 
               NP     λw*. ιx<s,e>[price(x,w*) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w*)[x(w”)=x(w*)]] 
         
λP<<s,e>,<s,t>>λw*.    the          N’ λx<s,e>λw*.price(x,w*) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w*)[x(w”)=x(w*)] 
ιx<s,e> [ P(x)(w*)=1 ]        
price        CP      λx<s,e>λw*. ∀w”∈Doxf(w*) [ x(w”) = x(w*) ] 
λx<s,e>λw*. price(x,w*)      
                that5      IP λw*.∀w”∈Doxf(w*) [g(5)(w”) = g(5)(w*)] 
                   
              Fred  VP 
                  
     knows1     t5 <s,e>  
λx<s,e>λzeλw*. ∀w”∈Doxz(w*) [ x(w”) = x(w*) ]  g(5) 
 
To derive reading A, we apply the intension in the top line in (24) to a 
given world w in (25a) to obtain the corresponding extension, and we feed the 
resulting object (of type <s,e>) into the argument slot of [[know]]. The resulting 
truth conditions in (25b) correspond to reading A: 
 
(25)  Reading A: 
a.   Extension of the NP in w:
5    
      ιx<s,e> [ price(x,w) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w) [x(w”) = x(w)] ] 
b.   Know+CQ + extension of the NP: 
λw. ∀w’∈Doxj(w)   
       [ ιx<s,e> [price(x,w) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w) [x(w”) = x(w)]]   (w’)  =     
      ιx<s,e> [price(x,w) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w) [x(w”) = x(w)]]   (w)   ] 
 
To derive reading B, the NP’s intension (of type <s,<s,e>>) is directly 
taken as the semantic argument of [[know]] in (26). The final truth conditions in 
(26c) match reading B: 
                                                 
4Since [[that5 Fred knows t5]] is a property of individual concepts (type <<se>,<st>>), the 
head noun price in the tree is assigned an intension of this type as well, so that (the intensional 
version of) the Predicate Modification Rule from Heim and Kratzer (1998) can apply between the 
two. That is, the intension of the lexical entry price in the tree (24) is a property of individual 
concepts (and not a property of individuals).  
5I use explicit world indexing of the entire NP (though I could have as well used free world 
indexing of each predicate within it). See Cresswell (1990), Farkas (1993) and  Percus (2000) for 
the empirical need of local and non-local world evaluation of NP predicates. For formal details, 
see Gallin (1975) for the formal Ty2 language and Percus (2000) for the syntax-semantics 
interface. 
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a.   Intension of the NP: 
  λw*. ιx<s,e> [ price(x,w*) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w*) [x(w”) = x(w*)] ] 
b.   Know+CQ + intension of the NP: 
  λw. ∀w’∈Doxj(w)  
      [ λw*. ιx<s,e>[price(x,w*) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w*) [x(w”)=x(w*)]]  (w’)  =      
   λw*. ιx<s,e>[price(x,w*) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w*) [x(w”)=x(w*)]]  (w)    ] 
c.   Simplification: 
  λw. ∀w’∈Doxj(w)   
 [    ιx<s,e> [price(x,w’) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w’) [x(w”) = x(w’)]]  =      
   ιx<s,e>  [price(x,w) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w) [x(w”) = x(w)]]    ] 
 
  The individual concept approach to simple CQs with know is remimiscent 
of the account of rise, fall and change as <s,e> taking verbs. For example, in 
(28a) (=6a), the NP the temperature of the lake contributes the individual concept 
in (27), which then combines with the intensional verb rise in (28b). This is 
completely parallel to the CQ example in (19)-(20). 
 
(27)   Semantic contribution of the NP the temperature of the lake:     
λw”. ιxe [temp-of-lake(x,w”)] 
 
(28)  a.  The temperature of the lake is rising. 
 b.    λw. rise ( λw’.ιxe[temp-of-lake(x,w’)], w ) 
 
  If the individual concept approach is to succeed with know, it should also 
address the challenges posed by rise, fall and change. There is a long standing 
puzzle, attributed to Anil Gupta in Dowty, Wall and Peters (1981), for the 
individual concept approach to verbs like rise. The puzzle is the following. The 
syllogism in (29) is intuitively valid:  
 
(29) Gupta’s  syllogism: 
  i.   Necessarily, the temperature is the price.
6 
  ii.  The temperature is rising.        
  iii.  The price is rising. 
 
However, its Montague-style translation (30) using individual concepts does not 
guarantee its validity: 
 
(30)  Dowty, Wall and Peters (with world variables explicit): 
 i.  λw. ∀w’∈Acc(w) [ ∃x<s,e> [ ∀y[temp(y,w’)↔ x=y] ∧  
           ∃z<s,e> [∀v[price(v,w’)↔z=v]  ∧  x(w’)=z(w’) ] ] ] 
                                                 
6Following Nathan (2005:61), (29i) can be understood as the elliptical version of e.g. 
Necessarily, the temperature in degrees Fahrenheit is the price in cents of a can of Coke. 
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 iii.  λw. ∃z<s,e> [ ∀v[price(v,w)↔z=v]  ∧ rise(z,w) ] 
 
To show that (30) does not guarantee the validity of the syllogism, Dowty, Wall 
and Peters (1981) sketch the model in (31), where there are three indices 
temporally ordered  (i1 < i2 < i3) and all indices stand to each other in the 
accessibility relation encoded by necessarily. In this model, (30i) is true at index 
i1, since at all indices i accessible from i1 [[the temperature is the price]](i) is 
TRUE: the unique x<s,e> in [[temperature]](i1) and the unique z<s,e> in [[price]](i1) 
are such that x(i1)=z(i1) (since they both equal 99); the unique x<s,e> in 
[[temperature]](i2) and the unique z<s,e> in [[price]](i2) are such that x(i2)=z(i2) 
(since they both equal 90); and the unique x<s,e> in [[temperature]](i3) and the 
unique z<s,e> in [[price]](i3) are such that x(i3)=z(i3) (since they both equal 81). 
The formula (30ii) is also true in this model when evaluated at i1, since the unique 
x<s,e> in [[temperature]](i1) is a rising function. But the conclusion (30iii) is false 
at i1, since the unique z<s,e> in [[price]](i1) is not a rising but a falling function. 
 
(31)  Model, with indices i1 < i2 < i3 and all accessible from each other: 
 [[temp.]](i1)={T1}   [[temp.]](i2)={T2}   [[temp.]](i3)={T3} 
 with    T1(i1) = 99  with   T2(i1) = 89  with   T3(i1) = 79 
  T 1(i2) = 100    T2(i2) = 90    T3(i2) = 80 
  T 1(i3) = 101    T2(i3) = 91    T3(i3) = 81 
 [[price]](i1)={P1} [[price]](i2)={P2} [[price]](i3)={P3} 
 with    P1(i1) = 99  with   P2(i1) = 91  with   P3(i1) = 83 
  P 1(i2) = 98    P2(i2) = 90    P3(i2) = 82 
  P 1(i3) = 97    P2(i3) = 89    P3(i3) = 81 
 
  Hence, the formulas in (30) do not correctly translate the valid argument 
(29).
7 The question is, what should be changed in the formal translations to secure 
the validity of the argument. 
Lasersohn (2005) argues that the Montague-style translations in (30) are 
problematic because they presume that the English nouns temperature and price 
express properties of individual concepts rather than simple properties of 
individuals, thus allowing for models like (31). Under the Russellian treatment of 
definite descriptions, one is forced to assume the former: e.g. in (30ii), we have 
the formula rise(x<se>,w) and, since x is queated to y, we must have the formula 
                                                 
7Gupta’s syllogism for individual concepts with rise can be reproduced for CQs with know. 
Consider reading A of (i.ii) and (i.iii) below. Under reading A, (i.ii) says that the unique price 
x<s,e> first announced on the radio is such that Martin knows x<s,e> (regardless of whether he knows 
when and where it was announced). Similarly, reading A of (i.iii) says that the unique price z<s,e> 
first announced on TV is such that Martin knows z<s,e>. Under these readings, the argument in (i) 
is valid. Then, translating the syllogism in a way parallel to (30) leads to the same puzzle as 
before. 
(i)  i. Necessarily, the price announced first on the radio is the price announced first on TV. 
  ii. Martin knows the price first announced on the radio.           
  iii. Martin knows the price first announced on TV.  
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the  λ-expression  λwλy<se>.temp(y<se>,w), that is, it expresses a property of 
individual concepts. (The same reasoning holds for the noun price.) Lasersohn 
notes that, if one assumes instead a Fregean approach to definite descriptions, the 
syllogism (29) can be translated using the simpler formulas temp(xe,w) and 
price(ve,w), thus assuming the simpler meanings as properties of individuals. 
Using the Fregean approach to definite descriptions, Lasersohn proposes to 
translate (29) as in (32). The formulas in (32) form a valid argument. 
 
(32)  Lasersohn’s (2005) translation of Gupta’s syllogism (with world variables 
explicit): 
  i.   λw. ∀w’∈Acc(w)  [ ιxe [temp(x,w’)]   =  ιze [price(x,w’)] ] 
 ii.    λw. rise ( λw’.ιxe[temp(x,w’)], w ) 
 iii.  λw. rise ( λw’.ιze[price(z,w’)], w ) 
 
  Although the Fregean treatment of definite descriptions solves the puzzle 
for the particular syllogism in (29), this solution is not general enough. The 
puzzle re-arises in parallel syllogisms where this solution cannot be applied. To 
see this, consider the variant of Gupta’s syllogism in (33), also valid: 
 
(33)  i.   Necessarily, every price that John knows is a/one price that Fred knows 
  ii.  One of the prices that John knows is rising.       
  iii. One of the prices that Fred knows is rising. 
 
Here the NPs at issue are not definite descriptions, and the N-bars price that John 
knows and price that Fred knows need to express precisely <s,<<s,e>,t>>-
functions, i.e. properties of individual concepts. This means that Lasersohn’s 
solution cannot be used here. The quantified NPs will translate as quantification 
over the variables x and z of type <s,e> in (34), which will serve as arguments 
both in the formula rise(x,w) and in the formula price-NP-knows(x,w). This means 
that the corresponding English nouns (or N’) express properties of individual 
concepts and that models like (35) falsifying the syllogism are possible.  
 
(34)  i.    λw.∀w’∈Acc(w) [∀x<s,e>[price-J-knows(x,w’) →  
 ∃z<s,e>[price-F-knows(z,w’) ∧  x(w’)=z(w’)]]] 
  ii.   λw. ∃x<s,e> [ price-J-knows(x,w)  ∧ rise(x,w) ] 
 iii.    λw. ∃z<s,e> [ price-F-knows(z,w)  ∧ rise(z,w) ] 
 
(35)  Model, with indices i1 < i2 < i3 and all accessible from each other: 
 [[price J knows]](i1) [[price J knows]](i2) [[price J knows]](i3) 
={J1}      ={J2}    ={J3} 
 with    J1(i1) = 99¢  with   J2(i1) = 89¢  with   J3(i1) = 79¢ 
  J 1(i2) = $1.00    J2(i2) = 90¢    J3(i2) = 80¢ 
  J 1(i3) = $1.01    J2(i3) = 91¢    J3(i3) = 81¢ 
 [[price F knows]](i1) [[price F knows]](i2) [[price F knows]](i3) 
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 with    F1(i1) = 99¢  with   F2(i1) = 91¢  with   F3(i1) = 83¢ 
  F 1(i2) = 98¢    F2(i2) = 90¢    F3(i2) = 82¢ 
  F 1(i3) = 97¢    F2(i3) = 89¢    F3(i3) = 81¢ 
 
  What changes could be made to the Montague-style translations in (34) to 
make them form a valid argument? Note that, besides the differences in the 
translation of definite descriptions and in the functions expressed by the nouns, 
the Montague-style translation (30i) and Lasersohn’s translation (32i) differed in 
another respect. In the first case, we extract the unique x<s,e> / z<s,e> from the NP’s 
extension at w’, and we apply it to the world w’ before obtaining the equation 
x(w’)=z(w’). This is sketched in (36). This leads to the original Montague-style 
translation (30i), repeated below as (37). 
 
(36)  λw. ∀w’∈Acc(w)  
[ [the unique x<s,e> such that {x<s,e>} ∈ [[the temperature]]
extension-at-w’] (w’) 
= [the unique z<s,e> such that {z<s,e>} ∈ [[the price]]
extension-at-w’] (w’)    ] 
 
(37)  λw. ∀w’∈Acc(w) [ ∃x<s,e> [ ∀y[temp(y,w’)↔ x=y]  ∧  
        ∃z<s,e> [ ∀v[price(v,w’)↔z=v]   ∧  x(w’)=z(w’) ] ] ] 
 
In Lasersohn’s case, we take the unique individual ιxe[temp(x,w’)] / 
ιze[price(z,w’)] that equals the NP’s extension at w’, and we form directly the 
equation ιxe[temp(x,w’)] = ιze[price(x,w’)].
8 This is sketched in (38). The result is 
Lasersohn’s translation (32i), repeated here as (39).   
 
(38)  λw. ∀w’∈Acc(w)  
[   the unique xe that equals [[the temperature]]
extension-at-w’   = 
     the unique ze that equals [[the price]]
extension-at-w’    ] 
 
(39)  λw. ∀w’∈Acc(w)  [ ιxe [temp(x,w’)]   =  ιze [price(x,w’)] ] 
 
To solve the variant of Gupta’s syllogism in (33), I propose to follow the 
latter strategy: We quantify over an x<s,e> / z<s,e> extracted from the NP’s 
extension, and we produce the equation x=z directly, without applying x<s,e> / 
z<s,e> to any world w’. This means that, in (33i), crosscategorial be equates two 
individual concepts x<s,e> and z<s,e>, not two individuals x<s,e>(w’) and z<s,e>(w’). 
The proposed translations for the variant of Gupta’s syllogism are in (40). When 
evaluated at a world w1 that is accessible to itself, (40) forms a valid argument, as 
the reader can check for herself. 
 
                                                 
8Alternatively to (38), we can take the unique λw’.ιxe[temp(x,w’)] / λw’.ιze[price(z,w’)] that 
is the NP’s intension, and apply it to w’ before obtaining the equation  ιxe[temp(x,w’)] = 
ιze[price(x,w’)]. The result is the same. 
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   ∃z<s,e>[price-F-knows(z,w’) ∧  x=z] ] ] 
  ii.   λw. ∃x<s,e> [ price-J-knows(x,w)  ∧ rise(x,w) ] 
 iii.    λw. ∃z<s,e> [ price-F-knows(z,w)  ∧ rise(z,w) ] 
 
 
4.  Propositional Account    
 
As we have seen, the individual concept account assumes a parallel treatment of 
individual concepts (ICs) with rise / fall / change and CQs with know. However, 
there are empirical differences suggesting that, at some point, the two types of 
NPs need to be distinguished. The question is how and from what point on in the 
derivation the two types differ. 
The first difference concerns coordination. Nathan (2005:55) notes that 
two verbs like rise and fall can be coordinated and share their NP argument in 
(41a). Similarly, two CQ-taking verbs can be coordinated and share the CQ 
argument, as in (41b). However,  coordination between rise/fall and know sharing 
the NP argument leads to ungrammaticality, witness (41c).
9 This pattern suggest 
that the IC argument of rise is, as a whole, different from the CQ argument of 
know. 
 
(41)  a.   [The price of milk]IC  fell last week and is rising this week.        
  b.   [The price of milk]CQ  is known to John and has been forgotten by Fred 
  c.   * [The price of milk]??   fell last week and is known to John. 
  
Building on Romero (2005a), Romero (2005b) develops a propositional 
account of CQ. Her aim is to account for the differences –including coordination 
structures and non-maximal readings– between NP arguments of extensional and 
intensional verbs (e.g. look for) on the one hand and CQs on the other. As it turns 
out, Romero’s (2005b) propositional analysis of CQs can be also used to 
characterize the external difference between ICs with rise / fall / change and CQs 
with know. Internally, the compositional derivation of IC NPs and CQ NPs is the 
same. For example, when composing the pieces of the NP the price of milk, in 
both cases we obtain the individual concept in (42). In the case of rise / fall / 
change, the meaning of the verb combines directly with this individual concept, 
as shown in (43). In the case of know, the individual concept combines first with 
the answer operator ANS in (44a). The result is the propositional concept –type 
<s,<s,t>>– in (44b). It is this propositional concept, and not the original 
individual concept, that constitutes the semantic argument of know, as shown in 
(44c,d).  
 
                                                 
9See Romero (2004) for related observations about coordination of extensional verbs, regular 
intensional verbs like look for and CQ-taking verbs. 
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(43)  a.     [[fall]]     =  λx<s,e>λw. fall(x,w) 
b.   [[[The price of milk]IC  fell]]     
=  λw. fall (λw*.ιxe[price(x,milk,w*)],w) 
 
(44) a.    ANSSTR   =  λy<s,e>λwλw’. y(w’) = y(w) 
b.  [[[ANSSTR The price of milk]CQ]]  
     = λwλw’. [ λw*.ιxe[price(x,milk,w*)] (w’)  =   
                        λw*.ιxe[price(x,milk,w*)]  (w)   ] 
     =  λwλw’. [ ιxe[price(x,milk,w’)]  =  ιxe[price(x,milk,w)] ] 
c.  [[know]]     =  λp<s,<s,t>>λxeλw.∀w’∈Doxx(w)[p(w)(w’)=1] 
d. [[[ANSSTR The price of milk]CQ  is known to John]]   
          =  λw. ∀w’∈Doxx(w) [ ιxe[price(x,milk,w’)]  =  ιxe[price(x,milk,w)] ] 
 
  The second difference between ICs with rise / fall / change and CQs with 
know concerns the internal structure of the NP, more concretely, the nature of the 
head noun (Löbner 1981, Janssen 1984, Nathan 2005). Relational nouns (price, 
temperature, governor, etc.) and non-relational nouns (picture on Jordan’s wall, 
semanticist, etc.) form acceptable ICs with rise / fall / change. The situation is 
different for CQs. Relational nouns form in general acceptable CQs (though there 
are numerous exceptions), whereas non-relational nouns are unacceptable CQs. 
The contrast  between ICs with rise / fall / change and CQs with respect to non-
relational verbs is illustrated by Nathan’s (2005) examples (45) (=8) and (46). 
 
(45)  A: John says he visits his niece Jordan with some frequency, but when I 
asked him what picture she has on her wall, he had no idea. 
  B: The picture on Jordan’s wall changes every month. #That’s why John 
didn’t know the picture on Jordan’s wall.         
  
(46)  A: What’s new at the linguistics department at USNDH? 
  B: The semanticist changed. 
  A: # Really? Tell me the semanticist (now). 
  
Nathan’s (2005) solution to this internal difference between ICs with rise / 
fall / change and CQs is the following. Nathan assumes that NPs with rise / fall / 
change are individual concepts whereas CQs are propositional in nature, roughly 
as above. However, he proposes that this difference is not determined externally, 
but internally at the level of the head noun. This is achieved by assuming lexical 
entries of basic type <s,<e,<et>>> for relational nouns and of basic type <s,et> 
for non-relational nouns, and constraining shifting operations as in (47)-(48). The 
basic intensions of relational and non-relational nouns can be shifted to sets of 
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able to head NP arguments of rise / fall / change: 
 
(47)  Shifting from basic intensions to sets of ICs: 
  a. <s,<e,et>>   →  <se,t>:    λP<s,<e,et>>λx<se>. ∃ye ∀w[P(w)(y)(x(w)) = 1] 
          b. <s,et>   →  <se,t>:  λP<s,et>λx<se>.∃ye∀w[P(w)(x(w))=1 ∧  
          R(w)(y)(x(w))=1] 
     w h e r e   f o r   a n y   N <s,et> being shifted: 
     ∀w1,w2 ∀xe [ N(w1)(x) ∧ N(w2)(x)  →   
        ∃ye[R(w1)(y)(x) ∧ R(w2)(y)(x)]] 
 
In contrast, the basic intensions of relational nouns, but not the basic intensions of 
non-relational nouns, can be shifted into sets of propositions. The shifter in (48a) 
performs the former shift, but no shifter is available to transform the <s,et> 
function of a non-relational noun into a set of propositions. As [[know]] is 
assumed to combine with a set of propositions, a relational head noun will, but a 
non-relational head noun will not, constitute an NP complement of the adequate 
semantic type.  
    
(48)  Shifting from basic intensions to sets of propositions: 
 a.  <s,<e,et>>  → <(e),<st,t>>: λP<s,<e,et>>λyeλp<st>.∃xe[p= λw1.P(w1)(y)(x)] 
  b. <s,et>        → <st,t> 
 
  I do not presently have an alternative account of this intriguing difference 
between ICs with rise / fall / change and CQs with respect to their head noun. 
Nevertheless, I would like to point out that making the propositional nature of 
CQs stem from the internal semantics of the NP –as in Nathan’s propositional 
account– instead of deriving it externally to the NP –as in Romero (2005b)– faces 
some challenges. 
  The first challenge concerns the aforementioned ambiguity between 
reading A and reading B. This ambiguity arises not only with CQs with know, as 
we saw in (3), but also with ICs with change, as in (49):  
 
(49)  The price that had to change changed. 
  a. Reading A: “There is a price x<s,e> –e.g. the price of milk– that had to 
change and that has changed.” 
  b. Reading B: “There used to be a price x<s,e> –e.g. the price of milk– that 
had to change, but now the price that has to change is another one –e.g. 
the price of ham.” 
 
  In Romero’s (2005b) propositional account, the ambiguity between 
reading A and reading B stems from the choice between the extension and the 
intension of the original NP, regardless of whether the main verb is rise / fall / 
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verbs rise / fall / change, then we have exactly the analysis that we saw in section 
3, applied now to (49) in (50)-(51). If the semantic contribution of the NP 
combines first with the ANS operator and later with the verb know, we have the 
derivations in (52)-(53):  
 
(50)  Reading A of The price that had to change changed: 
a.   Extension of the NP in w:    
      ιx<s,e> [ price(x,w) & ∀w”∈Deo(w) [change(x,w”)] ] 
b.   Change + extension of the NP: 
λw.   change ( ιx<s,e>[price(x,w) & ∀w”∈Deo(w) [change(x,w”)]], w)   
 
(51)  Reading B of The price that had to change changed:  
a.   Intension of the NP: 
  λw*. ιx<s,e> [ price(x,w*) & ∀w”∈Deo(w*) [change(x,w”)] ] 
b.   Change + intension of the NP: 
  λw. change (λw*.ιx<s,e>[price(x,w*) & ∀w”∈Deo(w*) [change(x,w”)]], w)        
    
(52)  Reading A of John knows the price that Fred knows under Romero’s 
(2005b) propositional account: 
a.   Extension of the NP in w:    
      ιx<s,e> [ price(x,w) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w) [x(w”) = x(w)] ] 
b.   ANS + extension of the NP: 
λwλw’. [ ιx<s,e> [price(x,w) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w) [x(w”) = x(w)]]   (w’)  =     
            ιx<s,e> [price(x,w) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w) [x(w”) = x(w)]]   (w)   ] 
c.   Know + ANS(extension of the NP): 
λw. ∀w’∈Doxj(w)   
       [ ιx<s,e> [price(x,w) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w) [x(w”) = x(w)]]   (w’)  =     
      ιx<s,e> [price(x,w) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w) [x(w”) = x(w)]]   (w)   ] 
 
(53)  Reading B f John knows the price that Fred knows under Romero’s 
(2005b) propositional account:  
a.   Intension of the NP: 
  λw*. ιx<s,e> [ price(x,w*) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w*) [x(w”) = x(w*)] ] 
b.   ANS + intension of the NP: 
λwλw’. [ λw*.ιx<s,e>[price(x,w*) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w*) [x(w”)=x(w*)]] (w’)     
  =     λw*. ιx<s,e>[price(x,w*) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w*) [x(w”)=x(w*)]] (w)] 
c.   ANS + intension of the NP, simplified: 
 λ wλw’. [  ιx<s,e>[price(x,w’) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w’) [x(w”)=x(w’)]]   =    
               ιx<s,e>[price(x,w) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w) [x(w”)=x(w)]]  ]  
d.  Know + ANS(intension of the NP): 
  λw. ∀w’∈Doxj(w)   
 [    ιx<s,e> [price(x,w’) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w’) [x(w”) = x(w’)]]  =      
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  In Nathan’s (2005) propositional account, the ambiguity between reading 
A and B is not given a unified analysis but must be derived using different means 
in each case. For ambiguous ICs with rise / fall / change, the strategy in (50)-(51) 
is adopted. But, for ambiguous CQs with know, we cannot apply the same 
strategy because we already have (a set of) propositions at the level of the head 
noun. Instead, the special shifter in (54) is needed to generate the truth conditions 
(55):
10 
 
(54)  Special shifter <s,<e,et>> → <st,t> for reading B with CQs: 
  For any Relative Clause intension Q<s,<st,t>>: 
  λP<s,<e,et>>λp<st>. ∃ye [ p = λw’.∃xe [Q(w’)(λw”.P(w”)(y)(x)) = 1] ] 
 
(55)  Reading B of John knows the price that Fred knows: 
λw0. ∀w∈Doxj(w0)  
[ ιp [C(p) ∧ ∃ye [ p = λw’.∃xe∀w”∈Doxf(w’) [y costs x at w”]] ] (w) = 1] 
  “John knows the unique true proposition p in the set {‘There is some x 
such that Fred knows that the milk costs x’, ‘There is some x such that Fred 
knows that the ham costs x’, ‘There is some x such that Fred knows that the oil 
costs x’, …}.” 
 
A second challenge for an account deriving the propositional nature of 
CQs  internally to the NP arises with nesting of know and rise / fall / change.  
Consider example (56), in which a CQ with know is nested within ICs with rise: 
 
(56)  The price / One of the prices that John knows is rising. 
 
In Nathan’s account, since the verb in the Relative Clause is know and the 
argument of know is intrinsically of propositional type, the Relative Clause as a 
whole must express a property of CQs, that is, a property of propositions. But the 
entire NP must pick an IC, since it has to combine with rise. Once we have 
propositions, it is not clear how to turn them back into ICs to derive (56) and the 
variant of Gupta’s syllogism (33). 
  In Romero’s account, the problem can be circumvented if we allow for the 
relative pronoun to abstract not over the complex [ANS+IC], but just over a trace 
t5,<se> embedded under ANS,  as in (57). This means that the Relative Clause will 
express a property of individual concepts and not of propositions (or of 
propositional concepts). Thus, the compositional semantics of the NP will remain 
–except for the part in (58)– as in (24), the extension of the entire NP will be the 
                                                 
10The shifter in (54) has been modified from Nathan’s (2005:94) original derivation to better 
match reading B. 
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[[rise]] will take this individual concept as its argument.  
 
(57)  The price [ that5 Fred knows [ANS t5,<se>] ] is rising. 
 
(58)       IP    λw*.∀w”∈Doxf(w*)[g(5)(w”) = g(5)(w*)] 
 
  F r e d    V P   λxeλw*.∀w”∈Doxx(w*)[g(5)(w”) = g(5)(w*)] 
 
λp<s,<s,t>>λxeλw*.  knows           λwλw’. g(5)(w’) = g(5)(w)   
∀w”∈Doxx(w)[p(w*)(w”)=1] 
    ANSSTR   t5 
        λy<s,e>λwλw’. y(w’) = y(w)   g(5) 
 
 
5.  Conclusions and Open Questions 
 
Three main approaches to concealed question NPs have been evaluated with 
respect to several sets of data. The tentative results are summarized in table (59): 
 
(59)  
 Basic  CQ Coord.  A/B 
ambiguity
Gupta’s 
syllogism 
Head 
Noun 
Pragmatic account  *  *  *  -----  ----- 
Individual concept 
account 
3  *  3  3  ??? 
Propositional account 
in Romero (2005b) 
3  3  3  3  ??? 
Propositional account 
in Nathan (2005) 
3  3  ??? ??? 3 
 
Many important questions on CQs with know and ICs with rise / fall / 
change remain open. I will briefly mention three here. 
First, as noted in Nathan (2005:85ff), relational ICs with change have 
slightly different semantics from non-relational ICs. This is illustrated by the 
contrast in the truth conditions of (60) and (61). If the set of individual governors 
stayed the same but all the governors switched states, (60) is judged true. In 
contrast, if the set of pictures on Jordan’s wall stayed the same but all the pictures 
changed positions, (61) is judged false.  Can this difference in truth conditions in 
the IC domain somehow derive to the difference in grammaticality between 
relational and non-relational nouns in the CQ domain? 
 
(60)  This year, every New England governor changed. 
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(61)  This week, every picture in Jordan’s wall changed. 
 
Second, ungrammatical CQs with non-relational nouns turn grammatical 
when certain types of modification are added (superlatives, Relative Clauses, 
post-nominal adjectives, etc.). This is illustrated in (62)-(63). It needs to be 
studied why these modifications yield such effect. 
 
(62)  a. # Tell me USNDH’s semanticist.             (Nathan 2005:97) 
  b. Tell me the semanticist who teaches at USNDH. 
 
(63)  a. # Tell me Vermont’s large city.             (Nathan 2005:97) 
  b. Tell me the largest city in Vermont / Vermont’s largest city. 
 
  Third and finally, though several authors have studied which 
interrogative-taking predicates can embed CQs ( see Grimshaw 1979, Dor 1993, 
Nathan 2005), there is, to my knowledge, no clear crosslinguistic pattern.  Verbs 
combining with propostions –like know, guess, announce, etc.– can embed a wide 
variety of CQs in languages with productive CQs. Verbs combining with question 
meanings –like ask and depend– allow for a limited number of CQs in English, as 
in (64), but allow for a wide range of CQs in Spanish, as in (65). 
 
(64)  a. Sam knows the capital of Vermont  /  the city I visited last week. 
  b. Sam asked the capital of Vermont  /  # the city I visited last week. 
        (Nathan  2005:120) 
 
(65)  Samuel me      preguntó la   capital  de Vermont  /  la  ciudad que  
            Samuel to-me asked      the  capital of  Vermont  /  the  city    that  
iba                a  visitar. 
I-was-going  to visit 
  ‘Samuel asked me the capital of Vermont / the city that I was gonna visit.’ 
 
 
Appendix: ANS with definite and non-definite CQs (in Reading B) within the 
propositional approach 
 
Definite CQ can have strongly exhaustive and mention-some readings (Romero 
2005b), as interrogatives clauses do (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984, Heim 1994, 
Beck and Rullmann 1999). The corresponding ANSSTR and ANSSOME operators for 
reading B are defined and applied to example (66b) below. 
 
(66)  a. I know what price(s) Fred knows / may know   
b. I know the price(s) that Fred knows / may know. 
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(68) [[the price(s) that Fred knows]] =   
λw*. σx<s,e> [ price(x,w*) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w*) [x(w”) = x(w*)] ] 
 
(69)  ANSSTR(y<s,<s,e>>)   =  λwλw’. y(w’) = y(w)     
 
(70) [[I know ANSSTR the price(s) that Fred knows]] = 
  λw. ∀w’∈DoxI(w) [ σx<s,e>[price(x,w’) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w’) [x(w”) = x(w’)]] =    
        σx<s,e>[price(x,w) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w) [x(w”) = x(w)]] ] 
 
(71)  ANSSOME(y<s,<s,e>>) =  λP<<s,<s,t>>,<s,t>>λw. ∃z<se> [ y(w)≥z  & 
          P ( λw’λw”.y(w”)≥z)(w) ]   
 
(72) [[I know ANSSOME the price(s) that Fred knows]] = 
λw. ∃z<s,e> [ σx<s,e>[price(x,w) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w) [x(w”) = x(w)]] ≥ z  &   
     ∀w’∈DoxI(w) [σx<s,e>[price(x,w’) & ∀w”∈Doxf(w’) [x(w”) = x(w’)]] ≥ z ]] 
 
Non-definite CQs in reading B have only the mention-some reading, as in 
(73). To derive this reading, we would need another ANS operator, defined in 
(75), that would apply to the NP’s <<se,st>,st> intension (74) to yield the final 
truth conditions in (76). 
 
(73)  John knows a price that Fred knows. 
 
(74) [[a price that Fred knows]] = 
  λQ<se,st>λw. ∃x<se> [price(x,w)  ∧ ∀w’∈Doxf(w) [x(w’)=x(w)] ∧ Q(x)(w)] 
 
(75)  ANSSOME(R<<se,st>,st>)     =         
 λ P<<s,<s,t>>,<s,t>>λw. ∃z<se> [ R(λx<se>λw*.x=z)(w) ∧ 
              P(λw’λw”.R(λx<se>λw*.x=z)(w”))(w) ] 
 
(76) [[I know a price that Fred knows]] = 
       λw. ∃z<se>[ ∃x<se>[price(x,w)  ∧ ∀w’∈Doxf(w)[x(w’)=x(w)]  ∧  x=z]   ∧ 
                   ∀w”∈Doxj(w)[∃x’<se>[price(x’,w”) ∧ ∀w’∈Doxf(w”)[x’(w’)=x’(w”)]  
          ∧  x’=z]]] 
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